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ABSTRACT
This study revisits the crowding in hypothesis and contributes to the literature in
two ways. First, in addition to total social spending, we examine whether
different types of social spending increase social capital among their target
groups. Second, we distinguish within- from between-country effects of social
spending. Data from the European Social Survey are analysed with logistic
multilevel regression models. We analyse two indicators of informal social
capital: having social contact with friends, family or work colleagues and
having anyone to discuss intimate and personal matters with. The results
show that the more governments spend on social protection, the more likely
people within those countries are to have social and intimate contact. The
results also demonstrate that within-country effects of the types of social
spending on having social contact disappear once we control for unobserved
heterogeneity between countries. Yet, within countries with higher social
spending on sickness/health care, old age and social exclusion, we find that
these specific expenditures facilitate intimate contact among people in bad
health, retirees and people who are having difficulties living on their present
income, respectively. Overall, the crowding in hypothesis is supported. We
conclude that it is important to examine the types of social spending and to
distinguish within- and between-country effects.
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Introduction
Governments aim to improve social cohesion and want people to be or
stay socially integrated. Providing social assistance could be one way of
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accomplishing this objective. A much-debated question is whether
countries with high social spending tend to ‘crowd in’ or ‘crowd out’
social capital of its citizens. Put differently, does higher government
expenditure on social protection foster or erode people’s social capital?
Empirical evidence tends to support the former view and seems less sup-
portive of the latter. Although some studies established no relation
between macro-level social protection expenditure and micro-level
social capital (Gesthuizen et al. 2008, 2009) or even a negative relation
for the elderly (Scheepers et al. 2002) and the poor (Van der Meer et al.
2009), many studies found that higher social spending appears to increase
average levels of social capital (Curtis et al. 2001; Rothstein 2001; Uslaner
2002; Hooghe and Stolle 2004; Van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Kääriäinen
and Lehtonen 2006; Larsen 2007; Van Ingen and Van Der Meer 2011;
Gelissen et al. 2012; Ellwardt et al. 2014). These somewhat inconsistent
findings are partly attributable to differences in research designs. Most
notably, previous research focused on different dimensions of social
capital (e.g. participation in informal social networks, volunteering in
formal networks or social trust, cf. Pichler and Wallace 2007), used differ-
ent cross-national data sources (e.g. Eurobarometer, ESS, EVS or ISSP)
and measured social spending differently (e.g. social protection expendi-
ture or a typology of welfare state regimes). Notwithstanding these differ-
ences, there is a growing consensus that social spending positively affects
individuals’ social capital, and we therefore focus on the theoretical mech-
anisms that predict a crowding in effect.
Approach and contributions
Most prior studies used total spending on social protection (as a percen-
tage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) to put the crowding in hypothesis
to the test. Little is known, however, about the impact of distinct types of
social protection expenditure on social capital of the social groups they
target (for a notable exception with regard to older people, see Ellwardt
et al. 2014). In addition to the commonly used total social spending
measure, we examine distinct types of social spending, that is, expenditure
on sickness/health care, disability, unemployment, old age and social
exclusion. We propose that these specific social protection expenditures
are conducive to people’s social capital primarily because they provide
(financial) resources to individuals who run a particularly high risk of
social isolation. A recent study has shown that unemployed people and
those in poor health are less likely to experience income poverty and
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material deprivation in countries with high social spending (Saltkjel and
Malmberg-Heimonen 2017). It remains a crucial question whether the
disaggregated types of social spending are effective in helping disadvan-
taged people (i.e. their target groups) to gain access to social capital. We
aim to provide new insights into the crowding in hypothesis by arguing
and showing that it is important to break social spending down into a
wide range of social benefits that are intended to protect people against
social risks such as illness, old age and unemployment.
To advance our knowledge on the impact of social protection expen-
diture at the macro level on social capital at the micro level, it is not
only relevant to distinguish types of social spending, but also to dis-
tinguish within- from between-country effects (Bell and Jones 2015;
Te Grotenhuis et al. 2015). Between-country effects of social spending
account for cross-national variation in social capital, whereas within-
country effects account for differences in social capital within countries
over time. We shed new light on the crowding in hypothesis by making
this distinction explicit, which is important from both a theoretical and
empirical perspective.
Theoretically, the mechanisms underlying within- and between-
country effects address fundamentally different processes. We argue that
the theoretical underpinnings for between-country effects of social spend-
ing reflect historically determined cultural and institutional differences
across countries that are relatively stable over time and not likely to
change quickly because they are the result of long-term socio-political
processes (Esping-Andersen 1990). Conversely, we propose that within-
country effects of social spending theoretically refer to governments that
may decide to in- or decrease their expenditures on social protection.
This would be more prone to change within countries in a shorter
period of time. Prior studies used theoretical arguments related to
within-country effects while failing to address these effects in their ana-
lyses (e.g. Van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006;
Gelissen et al. 2012).
Empirically, within- and between-country effects may considerably
differ as well. In fact, Snijders and Bosker (2012) state: ‘it is the rule
rather than the exception that within-group regression coefficients differ
from between-group coefficients’ (60). To the best of our knowledge, pre-
vious cross-national research is limited to between-country effects of
social spending. Yet, to draw valid conclusions about the crowding in
hypothesis, it is vital to also examine within-country effects.
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Between-country effects are usually based on a limited number of
samples within (a large number of) countries. These effects are vulnerable
to spuriousness because it is not feasible to take into account unobserved
differences between countries. We use high-quality data from seven
rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), covering multiple time
points for multiple countries, which allows us to estimate within-
country effects. More specifically, the data cover the period from 2002
to 2015, including economically turbulent times that led to changing
socio-economic circumstances, austerity policies and large fluctuations
in social spending in European countries (Armingeon 2013). This pro-
vides a unique opportunity to approach more reliable causal estimates
of the impact of social protection expenditure on people’s social capital.
Moreover, it enables us to assess to what extent within-country effects
diverge from between-country effects. Following the approach of Te Gro-
tenhuis et al. (2015), we introduce country dummy variables in our multi-
level models to absorb time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between
countries, reducing the risk of spurious results. Although we cannot
fully take into account unobserved characteristics that change within
countries over time, we do control for changing levels of wealth, unem-
ployment and income inequality.
We direct our attention to informal social capital (Pichler and Wallace
2007), which is one of the core dimensions of social capital (Rothstein
2001; Van Oorschot et al. 2006). Informal social capital constitutes a valu-
able resource (Coleman 1988). For individuals, having informal social
capital is associated with better health (Kawachi et al. 1999), more well-
being (Brehm and Rahm 1997) and status attainment (De Graaf and
Flap 1988; Lin 1999). Society as a whole may also benefit from people
who participate socially because it stimulates economic growth
(Fukuyama 1995) and social cohesion (Putnam 2000). In contrast, the
absence of informal social capital would have detrimental consequences.
We examine two individual-level indicators of informal social capital
that are consistently available in the ESS data: having social contact
with friends, relatives or work colleagues (in short: having social
contact) and having anyone to discuss intimate and personal matters
with (in short: having intimate contact). This enables us to examine the
impact of total social spending and the types of spending on two
aspects of informal social capital in a higher number of countries over a
longer time span compared to previous work. Unfortunately, measures
of formal social capital are not available in a sufficient number of ESS
rounds to adequately test within-country effects. In sum, we address the
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following research question: To what extent do social protection expendi-
ture and specific types of social spending increase the likelihood that indi-
viduals, particularly those who are disadvantaged, have informal social
capital within European countries?
The crowding in hypothesis
Existing studies have proposed and some have even tested mechanisms
that render the relation between social protection expenditure and the
likelihood that people have informal social capital plausible (e.g. Gelissen
et al. 2012). Note that we are not able to actually test these mechanisms
empirically. Rather than empirically testing them, we elaborate on these
mechanisms to establish theoretical links between social spending at the
macro level and informal social capital at the micro level. We contribute
to existing theoretical accounts by separating the arguments that support
between-country effects from those that support within-country effects.
As this study’s main innovation lies in the analysis of within-country
effects, we only formulate hypotheses about the within-country effects
of (the types of) social spending.
Between-country effects
Ever since Esping-Andersen’s (1990) released his seminal work on welfare
state regime types, comparative research into this topic has attracted much
interest. The existing literature is extensive and focuses particularly on the
causes and consequences of differences between welfare states. The by now
classic ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism’ include the liberal, conservative
and social-democratic regime, which are ranked from low to high decom-
modification: ‘the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a
socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation’
(37). Despite its merits, this classification received criticism (for an over-
view, see Arts and Gelissen, 2002) and our interest lies not in applying
these (or any) ideal types. Yet, it is relevant to consider the notion that
welfare states owe their origins to diverging historical processes and that
cultural norms about social solidarity may have developed accordingly.
Welfare states did not suddenly come into existence, but are the
outcome of long-term socio-political processes and demographic shifts
that, to this day, partly determine the degree of decommodification that
countries provide through social policy. Without going into much detail
about the actual historical forces behind the development of the welfare
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state (but see, for example, Flora and Heidenheimer 1981; Baldwin 1990;
Esping-Andersen 1999), it is important to consider that different national
patterns of welfare provision emerged. Countries widely differ in the rela-
tive roles they attribute to the state, market and family in providing social
welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990), which depends on a large number of
factors, such as the political composition of (past) governments, the level
of need for social support and the extent of market failure. Consequently,
countries also widely differ in their level of social spending. We argue
that the historical development and design of welfare states has far-reaching
consequences for contemporary cross-national variation in levels of infor-
mal social capital. As differences between countries in social spending are
relatively stable over the time period that we examine (i.e. 2002–2015),
we consider between-country effects of social spending to be responsible
for cross-national differences in levels of social capital.
Cultural norms with regard to social solidarity may have developed
alongside the emergence and design of welfare states. High government
expenditure on social protection would increase people’s informal social
capital by promoting a national and even individual norm of social soli-
darity (Van Oorschot and Arts 2005). A welfare state offering social
support to those in need sets an example for its citizens. People who
grow up and live in countries with high social spending are socialised to
encourage social solidarity and support (Rothstein 2001). Governments
may thus develop a normative culture that stimulates people’s social inte-
gration and creates opportunities to meet and mingle, increasing social
participation. This means that all may benefit from high social spending.
In countries where social spending lags behind or is relatively low, a nor-
mative culture may arise or persist in which people wonder why they
should help others when the government does not support or even
oppresses such endeavours (Völker and Flap 2001). Higher social protec-
tion expenditure thus fosters norms of social responsibility, which is con-
ducive to having social and intimate contact (Gelissen et al. 2012).
Within-country effects
The central premise of this study – building on prior contributions (Van
Oorschot and Arts 2005; Van Oorschot and Finsveen 2010) – is that social
protection expenditure increases (particularly, but not exclusively, finan-
cial) resources of individuals, which in turn may facilitate social and inti-
mate contact. Previous research used this theoretical mechanism to
substantiate between-country effects of social spending, whereas we
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argue that it should refer to within-country effects. Governments may
decide to in- or decrease their expenditures on social protection over
time. Eligibility criteria and social benefit levels can thus change within
countries over time, which may affect the likelihood that people have
informal social capital within those countries.
Participating in informal social activities usually involves some costs.
One can think of costs related to the activity itself (e.g. going to the
movies or having drinks), travel expenses (e.g. car fuel or public transpor-
tation) or buying gifts for celebratory occasions (e.g. birthdays or wed-
dings). People who live in countries with high social spending are
financially supported by the state. As Van Oorschot and Finsveen
(2010) put it: ‘Welfare states offer people with less personal social
capital access to a generalized, resourceful network of welfare institutions
and their services’ (196). These (financial) resources may enable informal
social participation when people have their basic needs covered and decide
to spend some of the money on social activities (Kohli 1999). Indeed, the
crowding in hypothesis postulates that: The more countries spend on social
protection, the more likely individuals within those countries are to have
social and intimate contact (H1).
What matters for individuals is not only how much a government
spends in total on social protection, but also how much a government
spends on certain types of social protection. Governments can invest in
a wide range of social benefits, including benefits for sickness/health
care, disability, unemployment, old age and social exclusion. They are
intended as ‘ … transfers to households, in cash or in kind intended to
relieve them from the financial burden of a number of risks or needs’
(Eurostat 2012). We examine whether these expenditures affect their
target groups. For example, if disability expenditure increases the likeli-
hood that disabled people have informal social capital, then the average
level of informal social capital in a country increases, but it should
mainly increase informal social capital of the disabled. We include those
social protection arrangements that are explicitly designed to increase
social participation among the following groups: sickness/health care
expenditure for people who report that they are in bad health, disability
and unemployment benefits for the disabled and unemployed, old age
benefits for retirees and social exclusion expenditure for individuals
who are having difficulties living on their present income.
Receiving government support could be just the boost in resources that
disadvantaged people need to be, stay or become socially active (Van
Oorschot and Finsveen 2009). One can think of medication that is
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compensated or health insurance coverage for people who are sick or
suffer from disease. Disabled persons and jobless people will benefit
from disability and unemployment benefits as their previous income is
(partly) substituted. Likewise, old age pensions could be the only
income that elderly receive. Welfare states may also offer actual services,
which is seldom acknowledged (Kautto 2002). Older people may, for
instance, receive free public transport or specialised transport services.
Vulnerable social groups could still face a struggle to satisfy basic needs,
but targeted interventions by welfare states can provide financial resources
and help to relieve people’s financial burden (Wallace and Pichler 2007).
To the extent that their basic needs are covered, social needs can become
more prominent. Economic security can be seen as a precondition of
informal social participation (Van der Meer et al. 2008). People who
receive social benefits may use part of those benefits for many purposes,
such as paying for a social activity or buying a public transport ticket.
Welfare states may thus be able to redistribute financial resources and
encourage informal social participation among, in particular, disadvan-
taged people (Van Ingen and Van Der Meer 2011). This leads to the fol-
lowing set of hypotheses: The more countries spend on sickness/health care
(H2a), disability (H2b), unemployment (H2c), old age (H2d) and social
exclusion (H2e), the more likely individuals in bad health (H2a), disabled
people (H2b), the unemployed (H2c), retirees (H2d) and people who are
having difficulties living on their present income (H2e) within those
countries are to have social and intimate contact.
Data and measurements
European Social Survey
We use individual-level data from seven waves of the repeated cross-
sectional ESS, conducted between 2002 and 2015. Individuals – 15 years of
age and older living in private households – are interviewed face to face.
Response percentages are relatively high and samples are generally represen-
tative at the country level, although large differences exist across countries and
waves. More information about the ESS, sampling strategies, response rates
and representativeness is available at www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
The pooled dataset includes 336,964 respondents in 36 countries.
Albania, Israel, Kosovo, Russia and Ukraine are excluded because of
missing information on social protection expenditure, dropping the
number of respondents to 302,100. We also excluded people who are in
school as students are not yet part of the labour force. This selection is
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needed to draw valid conclusions about the impact of disability, unem-
ployment and old age benefits. After removing respondents with a
missing value on the dependent variables and 19 country-year combi-
nations with less than 50 respondents, 269,553 respondents across 245
country-year combinations and 31 countries remain. An overview of
the country-year combinations is available online as supplementary
material (Table A1).1 Note that not every country is observed each year.
Informal social capital
Two indicators of informal social capital serve as dependent variables
(Pichler and Wallace 2007). First, respondents were asked how often they
meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues (in short: social
contact). Respondents could answer: never, less than once a month, once
a month, several times a month, once a week, several times a week and
every day. Never and less than once a month are coded 0 while the other
categories are coded 1. We dichotomised this variable as we expect that
social spending enables social participation of, in particular, people who
seldom or do not meet at all with friends, family and colleagues.2 Moreover,
intimate contact is a dichotomous variable, so dichotomising social contact
also increases comparability. Nearly 9 out of 10 respondents (89.8 percent)
have social contact, but there are huge differences across countries and
years, ranging from 48.6 percent in Hungary in 2013 to 98.8 percent in Por-
tugal in 2003. Second, respondents had to indicate whether they have
anyone to discuss intimate and personal matters with (in short: intimate
contact): no (0) or yes (1). 90.6 percent of the respondents have intimate
contact. There are again large differences across countries and years. In
Turkey in 2008, 57.9 percent of the respondents indicated they have
someone to discuss intimate and personal matters with, whereas this per-
centage amounts to 99.0 percent in Sweden in 2012.
Social protection expenditure
Social spending is measured as the percentage of GDP spent on social pro-
tection in each combination of country and year preceding the year of the
1We checked what would happen if we removed all country-year combinations with less than 150 respon-
dents. The results are provided as online supplemental material (Tables A2 and A3). The substantive con-
clusions do not change.
2Coding only ‘never’ as not having social contact is not feasible due to the small proportion of respondents
that never has contact with friends, family and colleagues. Including ‘never’, less than once a month’ and
‘once a month’ in the not having social contact category provides similar results as presented in Table 2
(results are available upon request).
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interview to establish causal ordering. We did not lag this variable two
years as applying for social benefits, means-testing or other bureaucratic
procedures do not take that long before applicants actually receive those
benefits. The ESSPROS manual provides the following definition (Euro-
stat 2012):
The integrated system of social protection statistics provides a coherent com-
parison between European countries of social benefits to households and
their financing. Social benefits are transfers to households, in cash or in kind
intended to relieve them from the financial burden of a number of risks or
needs. The functions are disability, sickness/health care, old age, survivors,
family/children, unemployment, housing and social exclusion. (7)
We only include the functions that are purposefully designed to facilitate
social and intimate contact among vulnerable groups, which are sickness/
health care, disability, unemployment, old age and social exclusion expen-
diture. These types of expenditure provide people in bad health, disabled
and unemployed people, retirees and individuals who are having difﬁcul-
ties living on their present income resources to initiate informal social par-
ticipation or to remain socially active. We refer to the ESSPROS manual
for an overview of the types of support the functions include. An analysis
of variance showed that 89 and 11 percent of the variation in social spend-
ing is attributable to differences between countries and within countries,
respectively.
Contextual-level control variables
We added GDP per capita, national unemployment rates and Gini coeffi-
cients as proxies for the macro-economic conditions in a country. As there
are large fluctuations in these characteristics within and between
countries, affecting governments in their ability and need to invest in
social protection, it is crucial to control for macro-economic circum-
stances. We distilled GDP per capita at Purchasing Power Parities
(PPP) from the World Bank to capture national wealth. This characteristic
is logged to minimise the influence of countries with high GDP. We
derived the unemployment figures from the online statistical database
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).
The figures again refer to the combination of country and year preceding
each interview year. Lagged Gini coefficients are obtained from the Stan-
dardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), which aims to
maximise comparability across countries and years (Solt 2016). The
highest correlation between the contextual-level variables was 0.625
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(between total social spending and GDP), which does not directly indicate
multicollinearity.
Individual-level control variables
We included a wide range of individual-level variables that have shown to
be related to informal social capital (Gesthuizen et al. 2008; Van Oorschot
and Finsveen 2009). Educational attainment refers to the highest level of
education respondents have completed. We condensed the International
Standard Classification of EDucation (ISCED) categories into primary,
secondary and tertiary education. Employment status consists of five cat-
egories: employed, unemployed, permanently sick or disabled, retired and
other. Subjective household income is measured by asking: ‘Which of the
descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income
nowadays?’. The answer categories were: living comfortably on present
income, coping on present income, finding it difficult on present
income and finding it very difficult on present income. We also included
age in years, gender, migrant status, marital status, number of children in
the household and urbanisation. Age is divided by 10 for ease in displaying
parameter estimates. We also added age squared to account for curvilinear
effects. Descriptive statistics of all variables are shown in Table 1.3
Multiple imputation of missing data
We imputed missing values on the individual-level independent variables
using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm in SPSS version
23, also known as the fully conditional specification approach. This
method specifies an imputation model for each variable with missing
values, sequentially going through all variables. We generated 25
imputed datasets. The model included all individual-level variables in
Table 1 along with country as well as year dummy variables to take into
account the nested structure of the data. 13,629 respondents (5.1
percent) had at least one missing value and across all variables, the
missing data proportions ranged between 0.1 (gender) and 1.8 percent
(subjective household income).4
3None of the variables are centred on their mean value. Next to practical reasons, we are not interested in
interpreting the intercept or in interaction effects. The estimates of social spending would be the same.
4Multiple imputation of missing values is widely accepted as superior to single imputation methods or
listwise deletion of missing values (Enders 2010). Nevertheless, we analysed a dataset in which all
the missing values were removed. The conclusions with regard to the hypotheses do not differ. The
results are available online as supplemental material (Tables A4 and A5).
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Analysis
We performed logistic multilevel regression analysis with SPSS version 23
to take into account the hierarchical structure of the data (i.e. individuals
nested within country-year combinations). As the dependent variables are
binary, logistic regression analysis is appropriate. We started with estimat-
ing a random intercept model without covariates. The intraclass corre-
lation for having social contact is 0.169 (0.667/[0.667 + 3.29]), meaning
that 16.9 percent of the total variance in having social contact is due to
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (N1 = 269,553; N2 = 245).
Range Mean SD
Dependent variables (N1)
Having social contact 0/1 0.889
Having intimate contact 0/1 0.906
Independent variables (N2)
Total social protection expenditure 10.6–34.2 23.943 5.367
Sickness/health care expenditure 3.5–10.4 6.643 1.556
Disability expenditure 0.2–4.7 2.190 0.945
Unemployment expenditure 0.1–3.7 1.311 0.868
Old age expenditure 3.4–14.0 8.731 2.149
Social exclusion expenditure 0.0–1.5 0.499 0.326
GDP per capita (logged) 9.2–11.1 10.333 0.380
Unemployment rate 2.1–24.8 7.865 3.667
Income inequality (Gini) 22.8–45.9 28.988 3.962
Independent variables (N1)
Educational level
Primary 0/1 0.312
Secondary 0/1 0.392
Tertiary 0/1 0.296
Employment status
Employed 0/1 0.535
Unemployed 0/1 0.063
Permanently sick or disabled 0/1 0.026
Retired 0/1 0.259
Other 0/1 0.117
Subjective household income
Living comfortably on present income 0/1 0.279
Coping on present income 0/1 0.461
Difficult on present income 0/1 0.187
Very difficult on present income 0/1 0.074
Age (/10) 1.5–10.5 5.038 1.719
Female 0/1 0.537
Migrant 0/1 0.141
Marital status
Married/Cohabiting 0/1 0.564
Divorced 0/1 0.105
Widowed 0/1 0.106
Single 0/1 0.225
Number of children in household 0–15 0.708 1.020
Urbanisation
Rural area 0/1 0.376
Small city 0/1 0.306
Big city 0/1 0.318
Source: European Social Survey (2002–2015).
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differences between country-year combinations. This figure amounts to
14.7 percent (0.565/[0.565 + 3.29]) for having intimate contact. The high
intraclass correlations confirm that performing the multilevel analysis is
appropriate.
We added all contextual- and individual-level variables in Model 1. We
also included country dummy variables to take into account unobserved
differences between countries and, hence, examine within-country
effects of (the types of) social spending (Te Grotenhuis et al. 2015).5
The country dummy variables were excluded in Model 2, but it includes
year dummy variables. The effect of (the types of) social spending in
this model thus represent between-country effects.
Results
Within-country effects of social spending on informal social capital
Table 2 presents the results of the analysis of the impact of total social
spending on both dimensions of informal social capital. Note that
Model 1 shows the within-country effects of social protection expenditure
and Model 2 its between-country effects. We first discuss the within-
country effects. The results show that total social spending is positively
related to both indicators of informal social capital. People within
countries with higher social spending are more likely to have social
(logit = 0.029) and intimate contact (logit = 0.106). This corroborates the
crowding in hypothesis (H1).6
We estimated average marginal effects (AMEs) to consider the strength
of the within-country effects. The AMEs of social spending on having
social and intimate contact are 0.00248 and 0.00793, respectively. This
means that individuals are 0.248 percent more likely to have social
contact and 0.793 percent more likely to have intimate contact when a
country increases social spending by 1 percent of its GDP. When we
look at Ireland, which is the country with the largest gap in social spending
5One could also analyse multiple observations for multiple countries with three-level models: individuals
(level 1), country-year combinations (level 2) and country (level 3). These models account for the fact
that the observations for one country are more similar to each other than observations for another
country (Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother 2016). However, they do not take into account time-constant
unobserved heterogeneity between countries.
6In the online supplemental material, we present the correlations between total social spending and both
dimensions of informal social capital for each country separately (Table A6). If the number of obser-
vations for a given country is too low, it is not feasible to calculate or reliably interpret the correlation.
This is the case for Croatia, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia and Romania. We conducted
sensitivity tests in which we excluded these countries simultaneously. We also performed a robustness
check in which seemingly influential countries were removed (Table A7). The results of these robustness
checks do not alter our substantive conclusions.
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Table 2. Within- (M1) and between- (M2) country effects of total social spending on
informal social capital, results of logistic multilevel regression analysis, logit
coefficients and standard errors (N1 = 269,553; N2 = 245).
Having social contact Having intimate contact
M1 M2 M1 M2
Total social protection expenditure 0.029
(0.013)*
0.058
(0.010)***
0.106
(0.024)***
0.036
(0.009)***
Contextual-level control variables
GDP per capita (logged) −0.192
(0.113)∼
0.689
(0.164)***
1.053
(0.206)***
0.463
(0.139)**
Unemployment rate −0.022
(0.009)*
−0.007
(0.013)
−0.015
(0.016)
−0.010
(0.011)
Income inequality (Gini) 0.041
(0.028)
0.007
(0.012)
0.127
(0.050)*
−0.001
(0.010)
Individual-level control variables
Educational level
Primary −0.452
(0.020)***
−0.450
(0.020)***
−0.580
(0.022)***
−0.581
(0.020)***
Secondary −0.222
(0.019)***
−0.223
(0.019)***
−0.297
(0.021)***
−0.297
(0.021)***
Tertiary ref. ref. ref. ref.
Employment status
Employed ref. ref. ref. ref.
Unemployed −0.054
(0.028)∼
−0.054
(0.028)∼
−0.289
(0.029)***
−0.290
(0.029)***
Permanently sick or disabled −0.533
(0.036)***
−0.532
(0.036)***
−0.386
(0.038)***
−0.389
(0.038)***
Retired 0.033
(0.022)
0.031
(0.022)
−0.132
(0.024)***
−0.134
(0.024)***
Other −0.054
(0.023)*
−0.054
(0.023)*
−0.253
(0.026)***
−0.257
(0.026)***
Subjective household income
Living comfortably ref. ref. ref. ref.
Coping −0.327
(0.021)***
−0.333
(0.021)***
−0.217
(0.021)***
−0.216
(0.021)***
Difficult −0.717
(0.024)***
−0.722
(0.024)***
−0.515
(0.025)***
−0.514
(0.025)***
Very difficult −1.079
(0.028)***
−1.083
(0.028)***
−0.855
(0.030)***
−0.852
(0.030)***
Age (/10) −0.365
(0.026)***
−0.365
(0.026)***
−0.538
(0.026)***
−0.536
(0.026)***
Age (/10) squared 0.010
(0.002)***
0.010
(0.002)***
0.029
(0.002)***
0.029
(0.002)***
Female −0.060
(0.014)***
−0.060
(0.014)***
0.434
(0.015)***
0.435
(0.015)***
Migrant −0.173
(0.020)***
−0.173
(0.020)***
−0.216
(0.021)***
−0.215
(0.021)***
Marital status
Married/Cohabiting ref. ref. ref. ref.
Divorced 0.014
(0.023)
0.013
(0.023)
−0.669
(0.023)***
−0.668
(0.023)***
Widowed 0.053
(0.022)*
0.052
(0.022)*
−0.793
(0.022)***
−0.792
(0.022)***
Single 0.052
(0.023)*
0.052
(0.023)*
−0.686
(0.023)***
−0.684
(0.023)***
Number of children in household −0.095
(0.007)***
−0.095
(0.007)***
0.039
(0.009)***
0.039
(0.009)***
(Continued )
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over time (a gap of 8.2 percentage points), the probability differences
amount to approximately 2.0 (8.2 × 0.248) and 6.5 percent (8.2 × 0.793).
We now turn to the within-country effects of the types of social spend-
ing on informal social capital for the specific groups they aim to support.
The results are presented in Model 1 in Table 3. The sample size differs per
analysis because we selected the following groups: people who self-
reported (very) bad general health, the permanently sick or disabled
and unemployed, retirees and people who are having difficulties living
on their present income.7 Unfortunately, estimating cross-level inter-
action effects was not feasible because of convergence problems.
The findings reveal that none of the types of total social protection
expenditure have a within-country effect on the likelihood of having
social contact among the specific target groups. Hence, we cannot
confirm the crowding in hypothesis for this indicator of informal social
capital (H2a to H2e). The fact that the estimates of these specific expen-
ditures do not reach statistical significance could be due to the smaller
sample sizes or because the variance in the types of social spending
and/or having social contact is limited within countries over time.
The picture looks different for the analysis of having intimate contact.
The higher the expenditure on sickness/health care (logit = 0.247) and old
age (logit = 0.254) in a country, the more likely that people in bad health
and retirees within those countries have intimate contact. These findings
are in line with H2a and H2d. Disability and unemployment benefits are
not related to this dimension of having informal social capital within
countries, which rejects H2b and H2c. Social exclusion expenditure
Table 2. Continued.
Having social contact Having intimate contact
M1 M2 M1 M2
Urbanisation
Rural area ref. ref. ref. ref.
Small city 0.007
(0.016)
0.007
(0.016)
0.010
(0.017)
0.009
(0.017)
Big city 0.033
(0.016)*
0.033
(0.016)*
0.063
(0.018)***
0.061
(0.018)***
Intercept 5.862
(1.163)***
−3.680
(1.688)*
−11.762
(2.091)***
−0.477
(1.429)
Contextual-level variance 0.039 0.333 0.163 0.228
Country dummy variables Yes No Yes No
Year dummy variables No Yes No Yes
Source: European Social Survey (2002–2015).
Significance levels: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ∼p < .1.
7The number of disabled people in our sample is too low to analyse separately. Therefore, the disabled and
unemployed are analysed together.
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does positively affect the likelihood of having intimate contact within
countries (logit = 0.467), confirming H2e. In countries where govern-
ments spend more on social exclusion, people who are having difficulties
living on their present income are more likely to have intimate contact.
Overall, we consider this to be rather convincing evidence for the crowd-
ing in hypothesis. In particular, the theoretical argument that the types of
social spending increase informal social capital of specific groups, that is,
people in poor health, retirees and individuals who are having difficulties
living on their present income, by providing them (financial) resources to
initiate or to continue intimate contact is supported.
Between-country effects of social spending on informal social capital
The effects of total social protection expenditure (Table 2) and the specific
types (Table 3) in Model 2 represent between-country effects. The results
show: the higher the government spending on social protection, the higher
the average level of social (logit = 0.058) as well as intimate contact (logit
= 0.036). The between-country effects of social spending thus also support
the crowding in hypothesis.
We again estimated AMEs to consider to what extent the effects are
substantive. The AMEs of social spending are 0.00494 for having social
Table 3. Within- (M1) and between- (M2) country effects of the types of social spending
on informal social capital for target groups, results of logistic multilevel regression
analysis, logit coefficients and standard errors.
Having social
contact Having intimate contact
M1 M2 M1 M2 N1
Type of social protection expenditure
Sickness/health care expenditure 0.076
(0.055)
0.207
(0.043)***
0.247
(0.063)***
0.173
(0.035)***
24,126
Disability expenditure 0.075
(0.139)
0.344
(0.063)***
−0.080
(0.177)
0.145
(0.053)**
24,034
Unemployment expenditure −0.070
(0.104)
0.049
(0.073)
0.077
(0.137)
−0.005
(0.059)
24,034
Disability + Unemployment expenditure −0.014
(0.074)
0.249
(0.051)***
0.014
(0.097)
0.092
(0.044)*
24,034
Old age expenditure 0.045
(0.040)
0.080
(0.023)***
0.254
(0.057)***
0.033
(0.018)∼
69,813
Social exclusion expenditure −0.004
(0.173)
0.733
(0.167)***
0.467
(0.219)*
−0.247
(0.129)∼
70,185
Country dummy variables Yes No Yes No
Year dummy variables No Yes No Yes
Note: Models are controlled for contextual- and individual-level variables (see Table 2).
Source: European Social Survey (2002–2015).
Significance levels: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ∼p < .1.
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contact and 0.00281 for having intimate contact. Comparing the countries
with the lowest (10.6 percent in Turkey) and highest (34.2 percent in
France) percentage of GDP spent on social protection, we can calculate
that the difference in probabilities between these countries is almost 12
percent ([34.2 – 10.6] × 0.494) for social contact and nearly 7 percent
(23.6 × 0.281) for intimate contact.
Moving on to the between-country effects of the types of social spend-
ing in Table 3, we see that these effects strongly point towards crowding in
effects (9 out of 12 times). We now compare these between-country effects
to the within-country effects in Model 1. The results are striking, especially
regarding having social contact. For this dimension of informal social
capital, it seems crucial to take into account unobserved heterogeneity
between countries, as the results are vulnerable to spuriousness (5 out
of 6 times). This holds true in only two instances for having intimate
contact, although in one instance (i.e. for social exclusion expenditure)
the direction of the effect even changes from negative to positive. If we,
for example, look at the effect of old age expenditure on having social
contact, the results show that it explains differences between countries
in average levels of having social contact, but not within countries over
time. Theoretically, mechanisms like diverging historical processes and
cultural norms about social solidarity would be plausible explanations,
whereas governments that in- or decrease social protection expenditure
over time do not seem to play a substantial role. The overall picture
that emerges is that interpreting between-country effects of social spend-
ing may lead to false conclusions with regard to the crowding in hypoth-
esis, particularly when theoretical arguments are used that assume a
within-country effect. Hence, if possible, it is important to control for
unobserved country heterogeneity.
To gain more insight into why within and between effects can differ so
much, we present a similar figure as Te Grotenhuis et al. (2015). Figure 1 is
an ecological scatter plot that shows the between-country effect of old age
expenditure on having social contact. Each dot represents a country-year
observation. The regression line represents the positive between-country
effect: if expenditure on old age is higher, the average number of people
having social contact is higher. We highlighted three countries to
explain why we found a non-significant within-country effect. For
Ireland, the relation between old age expenditure and having social
contact seems to be negative, whereas this relation tends to be positive
for the Netherlands. Yet, it is quite difficult to draw a regression line
through the observations for Poland. The slope would be flat, indicating
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that this type of expenditure has no effect in this country. In sum, an
average within-country effect across these country-year observations
appears to be absent, which is exactly what happens when we estimate a
country-fixed effects model.
Conclusions and discussion
This study has added to our understanding of the consequences of social
protection expenditure for two indicators of people’s informal social
capital in Europe: having social contact and having intimate contact
(Pichler and Wallace 2007). It has offered new insights into the crowding
in hypothesis by (1) examining the impact of different types of social
spending for specific target groups, besides total social spending, and
(2) by theoretically distinguishing and empirically testing within- and
between-country effects of social protection expenditure and the types
of social spending on informal social capital. Using data derived from
seven rounds (2002–2015) of the ESS, we have come to several innovative
conclusions.
Figure 1. The between country-year effect of old age expenditure on having social
contact. Source: European Social Survey (2002–2015).
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Our first conclusion is that total social spending is positively related to
both dimensions of informal social capital. The more governments spend
on social protection, the more likely people are to have contact with
friends, family or work colleagues and the more likely they are to have
anyone to discuss intimate and personal matters with. Total social spend-
ing helps to explain differences in having social and intimate contact
within countries over time (within-country effects) as well as cross-
national variation in having social and intimate contact (between-
country effects). These findings are clearly in line with the crowding in
hypothesis. Previous research on informal social capital only tested and
found between-country effects of social spending while using theoretical
arguments for within-country effects (e.g. Van Oorschot and Arts 2005;
Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006; Gelissen et al. 2012). This is the first
study to theoretically distinguish within- from between-country effects
of social spending on informal social capital and to empirically test both
these effects. We argued that the theoretical mechanism underlying
within-country effects is based on governments that increase expenditures
on social protection, which provides financial resources and services to
people, enabling them to participate socially. Contrastingly, between-
country effects are the result of historical processes that shaped welfare
states differently and may have also led to different cultural norms with
regard to social solidarity. Further research is required to determine the
empirical validity of these theoretical mechanisms.
Our second contribution to the literature is that we disaggregated total
social spending into a wide range of social benefits (i.e. expenditures on
sickness/health care, disability, unemployment, old age and social exclu-
sion) and examined whether these types of social spending increase infor-
mal social capital of their specific target groups. The results showed that,
within countries over time, the types of social protection expenditure are
unrelated to the likelihood that disadvantaged individuals have social
contact and, to a lesser extent, for having intimate contact as well. We
demonstrated that this appears to be due to the fact that unobserved
differences between countries were not taken into account. Unobserved
country heterogeneity seems to be partly responsible for the crowding
in effect of sickness/health care, disability, old age and social exclusion
expenditure. Although we were not able to fully control for time trends
within countries, it is important to control for time-constant differences
between countries to approach more reliable causal effects of (the types
of) social spending on informal social capital.
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In contrast to the findings with regard to having social contact, some of
the types of social spending are related to the likelihood that disadvan-
taged people have intimate contact. More specifically, sickness/health
care, old age and social exclusion expenditure seem to financially enable
intimate contact for their specific target groups: people in poor health,
retirees and people who are having difficulties living on their present
household income. This supports our theoretical line of reasoning about
within-country effects and the contact-facilitating nature of financial
resources and services: governments spending more on social protection
may provide disadvantaged individuals with resources that relieve their
financial burden, which allows them to (continue to) have intimate
contact.
Although this study yielded valuable insights, we would like to point
out some potential shortcomings. To reach a better understanding of
the broadness of the phenomenon, it would be more informative to
have even more indicators of informal social capital. In addition, the
inclusion of family, friends and especially colleagues into one measure
may raise validity questions. It has also become apparent that some
types of social spending are important in facilitating intimate contact,
whereas they are not associated with having social contact. A possible
explanation for this finding could be that disadvantaged people who are
supported by the welfare state are more likely to spend some of that
money on more urgent matters like meeting with people with whom
they can discuss intimate and personal matters and who may offer the
most help, rather than ‘wasting’ some of that money and time on their
broader social network. With the classic distinction proposed by Grano-
vetter (1973) in mind, it could be more valid to distinguish contact with
friends, family and colleagues separately. The non-significance of the
relation between the types of social spending and having social contact
may now have been obscured by combining these different social relations
into one measure.
Another point of discussion is that some types of social spending do
have an influence on people’s likelihood to have intimate contact within
countries (sickness/health care, old age and social exclusion expenditure),
whereas other types do not (disability and unemployment expenditure).
The group of disabled and unemployed people in the data is small,
which raises concerns about statistical power. It could also be the case
that those who are disabled and jobless have more time on their hands
to participate socially while they do not face the physical restrictions
that people in bad health encounter. In other words, disabled and
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unemployed persons are more mobile than elderly and people with health
issues. Previous research found that, controlling for financial resources,
unemployed people actually participate more because time constraints
are not an issue (Gallie et al. 2003). For people who are sick or suffer
from (non-work related) disease and for older people, receiving govern-
ment support could be just the boost they need to become or remain
socially active. Future studies should further examine the impact of the
types of social protection expenditure on informal social capital of the
groups they target.
Another possible area of future research would be to replicate this study
with formal social capital as outcome. We limited the scope of this study
to informal social capital. Indicators of formal social capital are only avail-
able in two rounds of the ESS, which is not sufficient as a high(er) number
of time points are needed to assess within-country effects of social spend-
ing. It would thus be helpful if questions about formal social capital would
be continuously included in cross-national data collection efforts. Pre-
vious conclusions about the crowding in hypothesis with regard to
formal social capital may also be different when taking into account unob-
served heterogeneity between countries (e.g. Van Ingen and Van Der
Meer 2011).
To summarise, we showed that it is important to examine the impact of
the types of social spending and, if feasible, to control for time-stable
differences between countries when assessing crowding in effects on infor-
mal social capital. We were able to demonstrate the (potential) danger of
interpreting between-country effects as if they were within-country effects,
which is also important from a theoretical point of view. Following this
approach leads us to the conclusion that countries with high social spend-
ing, if anything, seem to increase informal social capital of its citizens,
once more providing evidence against the crowding out hypothesis.
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